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N THE MOTION PICTURE-TELEVISION (VIDEO-FILM) IN-
DUSTRY,' there are five related conflicts over income distribution.
These conflicts, involving millions of dollars, have been fought for
over a decade before the courts in antitrust cases, 2 before the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) 3 and courts reviewing the FCC's
regulatory decisions, 4 and before Congress in debates over the
Assistant Professor of Economics, Herbert H. Lehman College of the City University of
New York. B.A., Harvard University, 1962; J.D., Stanford University School of Law, 1967;
Ph.D., Columbia University, 1975.
1. For the purposes of this article, the video-film industry is defined to consist of the
showing for profit of motion picture films or video tapes in theaters, on cable television, or on
broadcast television.
The term "video-film" includes all motion pictures distributed to theaters, all motion pic-
tures shown on television-whether or not produced originally for that medium-as well as
programs and series developed solely for television.
2. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (issuance to television net-
work by societies of composers and lyricists of blanket licenses to copyrighted musical composi-
tions at negotiated fees does not constitute price fixing illegal per se under the antitrust laws);
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusal of motion picture and
television producers to contract for composers' services, except on certain standard terms, re-
serving to the producers the copyright and other ownership rights in the compositions, consti-
tutes a violation of the antitrust laws). For a discussion of Broadcast Music, Inc., see notes
211-25 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Bernstein, see notes 192-97 and accom-
panying text infra.
3. See, e.g., Inquiry into Policies and Practices Concerning the Exclusive Purchase of
Television Program Product and Ability of Conventional Television Stations, Subscription Tele-
vision Stations, Cable Television Systems, and Subscription Cable Television Operations to Ob-
tain Programming, 41 PAD. REG. 2d (P-H) 839 (1977) (report and order of termination of in-
quiry), aff'd, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Cable Television
Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 24 RAD. REG. 2d (P-H) 1501 (1972) (discussing and adopt-
ing new rules regulating cable television).
4. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 696 (1979) (holding that the
FCC lacks authority to promulgate rules requiring cable television systems to act as common
carriers by providing public access channels); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S.
649, 663 (1972) (holding that the FCC has authority to require cable television systems to
operate to a significant extent as a local outlet and to have production facilities available for local
programs); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (holding that the
FCC has jurisdiction to regulate the cable television industry if the regulations are reasonably
ancillary to effective performance of the FCC's responsibilities for the regulation of television
(417)
1
Cirace: Five Conflicts over Income Distribution in the Motion Picture-Tel
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REVIE\V [VOL. 25: p. 417
Copyright Act of 19765 and the proposed Communications Act of
1979.6 Indeed, the battle has recently spread to the state legisla-
tures.7 The parties to the conflicts are either those who have prop-
erty rights in the films and tapes, or those who exhibit them for
profit-i.e., owners of music copyrights,' video-film producers, 9 mo-
tion picture exhibitors, 10 television networks," and cable telecast-
ers. 12
The five conflicts surface in disputes concerning the rules 13 gov-
erning the vertical relationships 14 in this industry. It should be noted
broadcasting); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1248, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming
the order of the FCC terminating its inquiry into contracts granting television networks exclu-
sive exhibition rights of certain programs); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 60 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (holding that the FCC is without authority to promul-
gate rules for cable television systems which 1) limit the amount of programming time devoted
to feature films and sports events, 2) regulate the type of feature films and sports events which
can be shown, or 3) prohibit commercial advertising on pay cable television systems); Treasure
Valley CATV Comm. v. United States, 562 F.2d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding FCC
decision limiting importation of network signals by a particular cable television service).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. 1978). See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. passim, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659 passim; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-82 passim, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5810-23 passim; Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before The Sub-
coonu. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 passimn (1975); 122 CONG. REC. 3821-28, 3831-41, 31977-
2016 (1976) (debate on Copyright Act of 1976).
6. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See, e.g., Cable Television Regulation Over-
sight: Hearings Before Subcomin. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 119-20 (1976). See generally Besen, The Economics of
the Cable Television "Consensus," 17 J.L. & Econ. 39 (1974).
7. See Harmetz, Blind Bidding for Films on Trial, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1979, § C, at 7,
col. 4. For a further discussion of state blind bidding laws, see notes 145-65 and accompanying
text infra.
8. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1979). For further discussion
of Broadcast Music, Inc., see notes 211-25 and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 978 (2d Cir. 1975). For
further discussion of Bernstein, see notes 192-97 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal
dismissed mer. sub nora. M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th
Cir. 1949); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80
F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y.), modifed, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). For further discussion of
Alden-Rochelle, see notes 185-87 and accompanying text infra.
11. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); United States v. NBC [1978]
1 Trade Cas.
61,842, at 73,503 (C.D. Cal.), approving consent decree entered in [1978] 1 Trade Cas.
61,855, at 73,580 (C.D. Cal.).
12. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Cable Television Report
and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
13. See note 4 supra.
14. Vertical relationships are to be distinguished from horizontal relationships. Firms are
related horizontally if they are side-by-side competitors in a market. See C. WILCOX & W.
SHEPHERD, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINEss 227 (5th ed. 1975). An example of horizontal
integration is a merger between two steel-making firms. A vertical relationship exists between
two firms which are both in the same chain of production but which are not side-by-side com-
petitors. Id. A firm which produces video tapes is vertically related to television networks which
broadcast them. An example of vertical integration is a merger which links a video tape supplier
with one or more of its buyers. See also J. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRIcEs 205
(1974); Coarse, The Nature Of The Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386-90 (1937).
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at the outset that the direct impact on consumers of a change in these
rules is often hard to perceive. In the absence of consumer protection
policy considerations, the conflicts are sometimes tantamount to
naked battles over the distribution of income. 15  On the other hand,
the rules imposed by government to resolve these five vertical con-
flicts often significantly affect consumer welfare because of their influ-
ence on horizontal competition among motion picture theaters, cable
telecasters, and television broadcasting networks.16
The five conflicts are as follows. First, as between the television
networks and the video-film producers, should the networks be al-
lowed to demand long term exclusive exhibition rights with respect to
programs produced by video-filn -producers and, if so, should any
time limit be placed on such exclusive exhibition rights? 17 Second,
as between film producers and motion picture theater owners, should
the producers be allowed a) to require the theater owners to bid
blind - that is, to require them to bid for the right to exhibit a film
without being given a chance to view it prior to bidding - and b) to
demand nonrefundable guarantees from theater owners for such
exhibition? 18  Third, as between composers and video-filn produc-
ers, should composers have the copyright and other ownership rights
in words and music composed for video-films rather than be forced to
surrender them to the producers; if so, should composers have the
15. See, e.g., United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842 at 73,503, 73,517-18
(C.D. Cal.), approving consent decree entered in United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas.
61,855, at 73,580 (C.D. Cal.). In NBC, the government sued a television network, alleging that
provisions in network contracts with program producers violated the antitrust laws. Id. at
73,504-06. In approving a consent decree, the court recognized that the conflict was almost
entirely over income distribution and had little direct impact on competition or consumers:
The actions against the three television networks never were instituted for the purpose of
breaking up the oligopolistic control of the television industry or for the purpose of foster-
ing competition among the three of them. The government's case has been predicated on
the recognition that each of the networks possesses enormous market power, and that this
power is being used to place independent program producers and suppliers ... at a dis-
tinct competitive disadvantage. From the outset the government has sought to improve
the lot of the independent producers and suppliers and enhance competition in the buy-
ing and selling of television programming by imposing on the networks restrictions on the
terms and conditions governing their contracts with the independent suppliers. ... The
remedy ... is to limit the benefits and financial rewards that otherwise would flow from
an exercise of this power.
Id. at 73,517-18 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 73,511-12. The preceding assertion assumes
that the networks are already exploiting their monopoly power over advertisers to the fullest
and therefore cannot charge advertisers higher rates in order to recoup losses incurred by hav-
ing to pay more to program producers. If the networks raised their advertising rates as a con-
sequence of paying video-film producers more, much of this increase would be passed on to
consumers, in which case there would be an effect on resource allocation as well as an effect on
income distribution.
16. For example, decisions whether and on what terms cable telecasters importing distant
television signals must pay copyright royalties will substantially affect competition between
broadcast and cable television. See notes 231-56 and accompanying text infra.
17. For a discussion of these issues, see notes 106-44 and accompanying text infra.
18. For a discussion of these issues, see notes 106-13 & 145-65 and accompanying text infra.
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right to renegotiate their share in the profits from the continuing
exhibition of such video-films; if so again, should composers be per-
mitted to bargain collectively for such fees in musical performing
rights societies? 19 Fourth, as between composers and television
networks, should composers similarly have the copyright and other
ownership rights to words and music used by the networks; if so,
should composers also have the right to periodically renegotiate per-
formance fees with the networks through collective bargaining
societies? 20 Fifth, as between cable telecasters and television net-
works (or the owner of the performance rights in a copyrighted work),
should cable telecasters have copyright liability for programs which
they import from distances greater than television broadcast signals
are normally carried; if so, to whom and upon what terms?21
Commentary on these conflicts has suffered from two in-
adequacies. First, it has tended to be narrow, focusing on each bilat-
eral conflict rather than viewing the problem as industrywide. Thus,
commentators have simply concerned themselves with the conflicts
between broadcasters and cable telecasters, 22 between musical
copyright holders and the television networks, 23 or between program
prod ucers and the networks. 24
Second, commentators have tended to engage in either a
political-legal analysis of the conflicts among interest groups, 25 or an
economic analysis which does not directly focus on the reasons for the
conflicts. 26 A political-legal analysis does have the virtue of dealing
19. For a discussion of these issues, see notes 166-208 and accompanying text infra.
20. For a discussion of these issues, see notes 166-88 & 209-30 and accompanying text infra.
21. For a discussion of these issues, see notes 231-56 and accompanying text infra.
22. See, e.g., Besen, supra note 6; Lapierre, Cable Television and the Promise of Program-
ming Diversity, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 25 (1973); Long, Antitrust and the Television Networks:
Restructuring Via Cable TV, 6 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 4, at 99 (1973); Park, Cable
Television, UHF Broadcasting, and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J.L. & ECON. 207 (1972); Pear-
son, Cable: The Thread by Which Television Competition Hangs, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 800
(1974); Note, Pay Television: The Pendulum Swings Toward Deregulation, 18 WASHBURN L.J.
86 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP: An Economic Analysis of a Political Problem, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 277 (1978); Garner, United States v. ASCAP: The Licensing Provisions of
the Amended Final Judgment of 1950, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 119 (1976); Note, The Mid-
dleman as Price Fixer: Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
Authors, & Publishers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 488 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Middleman as
Price Fixer]. Note, CBS v. ASCAP: Performing Rights Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE
L.J. 783 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Performing Rights Societies].
24. See, e.g., Fastow, Competition, Competitors and the Government's Suit Against the
Television Networks, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Krasnow & Quale, Developing Legal Issues in Cable Communications, 24
CATH. U.L. REV. 677 (1975); Lapierre, supra note 22; Pearson, supra note 22; Simon, Local
Television versus Cable: A Copyright-Theory of Protection, 31 FED. CoM. B.J. 51 (1978); Note,
Cable Television and Content Regulation: The First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper,
51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 133 (1976); Note, supra note 22.
26. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 25: p. 417
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directly with a conflict, but can not reveal its underlying structure.
The economic analyses have not attempted to explain the conflicts,
but have focused instead on a) how competition and viewer welfare
will be affected if cable television is allowed to compete with broad-
cast television; 27 b) whether transaction costs of individual contractual
agreements among the various copyright, producer, and exhibitor
groups make collective bargaining necessary; 28 c) econometric specu-
lation on the impact of cable television on broadcasting; 29 and/or d)
whether the networks' financial interests in programs affects their de-
cisions concerning which programs to retain.30
The analysis contained in this article is based upon the peculiar
characteristics of video-films 31 and the market structures at the vari-
ous vertical levels. 32  It also highlights the effect of governmental
intervention on the conflicts described above. Part II contains a
theoretical analysis of the income distribution problem in the video-
film industry. 33 In Part III, that analysis is used to show that the
five conflicts stated above are different manifestations of the same
problem.3 4  Finally, Part IV suggests means for more effectively
balancing the competing interests. 35
II. THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM IN THE
VIDEO-FILM INDUSTRY
Four characteristics of video-films and the video-film industry in
general combine to cause the income distribution problem in this in-
27. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION app. (Comm. Print 1978); [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS STUDY]; R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION
REGULATION 20-57, 151-82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOLL]; Park, supra note 22.
28. See, e.g., The Middleman as Price Fixer, supra note 23; Performing Rights Societies,
supra note 23.
29. See, e.g., NOLL, supra note 27, at 151-82; Comanor & Mitchell, Cable Television and
the Impact of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 154 (1971); Fisher & Ferrall,
Community Antenna Television Systems and Local Television Station Audience, 80 Q.J. ECON.
227 (1966); Mitchell & Smiley, Cable, Cities and Copyrights, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGE-
MENT SCI. 235 (1974); Park, Prospects for Cable in the 100 Largest Television Markets, 3 BELL
J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 130 (1972).
30. See Crandall, The Econoinic Effect of Television Network Program "Ownership", 14 J. L.
& ECON. 388 (1971). Although Crandall concluded that network syndication interests or profit
sharing did not affect retention decisions, id. at 401, a more significant issue is whether such
financial interests, or the absence of them, affects the original decision to exhibit a program or
series. As to this question, the FCC found a direct relationship between new programs chosen
for network schedules and network acquisition of subsidiary rights and interests. See Mount
Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 485 (2d Cir. 1971).
31. See notes 40-105 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 106-256 and accompanying text infra.
33. See notes 36-105 and accompanying text infra.
34. See notes 106-256 and accompanying text infra.
35. See notes 258-70 and accompanying text infra.
1979-1980]
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dustry: 1) the uncertainty of demand for the products at the time the
decisions are made to invest in them;3 6 2) the character of the prod-
ucts as "public goods"; 3 7 3) the tendency within the industry toward
neutral monopoly or, at least, substantial concentration; 38 and 4) the
character of the products as "common products." 9  These charac-
teristics are discussed in the next four sections.
A. The Uncertainty of Demand Characteristic
and its Relationship to Market Power
The same artistic material may be recorded on film, video tape,
or disc and may be shown for profit worldwide either in theatres, on
cable television, or on broadcast television at different intervals for
indefinite periods of time. For a particular video-film, the extent and
duration of demand is difficult to foresee prior to exhibition. 40 This
uncertainty means that a great deal of the investment in a video-film,
which often amounts to millions of dollars, must be undertaken be-
fore an accurate estimate of its earning potential exists.4 ' Moreover,
there are enormous disparities in the financial returns of different
video-films. 4 2
Since any preexhibition estimate of the value of a particular
video-film is uncertain, those who have ownership, financial, or
exhibition interests in it, (and who also have monopoly power),4 3 can
shift the distribution of income in their favor by bargaining for a
larger share of financial returns in excess of production costs or by
shifting the risk of loss to other members of the chain of production
and distribution. Consider the following examples, which will be dis-
cussed in detail below: 1) television networks have enough monopoly
power to require independent video-film producers to grant them
multi-year exclusive exhibition options on video-film series before
their exhibition value is known; such options probably allow the net-
works to appropriate a larger share of the profits from video-films
than would be likely in a competitive market; 44 2) motion picture
36. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text infra.
37. See notes 47-70 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 72-103 and accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 104-05 and accompanying text infra.
40. See, e.g., G. JOWETT, FILM 434-35 (1976); NOLL, supra note 27, at 44-45; R. STANLEY,
THE CELLULOID EMPIRE 249, 254 (1978).
41. See T. BALIO, THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 461-64 (1976).
42. See, e.g., id.; NOLL, supra note 27, at 44-45; R. STANLEY, supra note 40, at 231, 248,
275.
43. "Monopoly power" has been described as the power to control prices or exclude com-
petition. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). See also
E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 101 (2d ed. 1973).
44. See notes 106-44 and accompanying text iufra.
422 [VOL. 25: p. 417
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producers have enough monopoly power to shift some of the risk of
loss associated with film production to theater exhibitors by requiring
them to engage in blind bidding and by requiring nonrefundable
guarantees; 45 3) performing rights societies can compel the renegotia-
tion of their share of the profits in existing video-filns to be shown on
television by invoking their right to prohibit the exhibition of such
films as bargaining leverage; this right permits these societies to exer-
cise monopoly power over the distribution of revenue derived from
the exhibition of existing video-films. 46
B. The Public Good Characteristic
Video-films have the public good characteristic. 47  Public goods
are to be distinguished from private goods. A private good is one
which, when consumed by A, cannot be consumed by B, C, or D.48
An apple is an example. Public goods are defined as goods whose
consumption by individual A does not preclude consumption by B, C,
D, or others.4 9  This is another way of saying that the marginal cost
of additional consumption is zero. 50  In television broadcasting, the
marginal cost of an additional viewer is zero; this is also true of cable
television once the original connections are made, and of motion pic-
ture exhibitions up to the capacity of the theaters. 51
According to the theory of perfect competition, a product's price
is "efficient" if it equals the cost of producing an additional unit -
i.e., if price equals marginal cost.5 2  Under this theory, it is difficult
to determine an efficient price for public goods including such public
goods as musical compositions, motion picture films, and television
programs which, once created and exhibited, are nearly costless to
supply to an additional viewer. 53  Some economists believe that deci-
45. See Harmetz, supra note 7; notes 145-65 and accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 209-22 and accompanying text infra.
47. See B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 15-16 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as OWEN]. For an examination of the theory of public goods, see generally Samuel-
son, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 332 (1958); Samuel-
son, Diagrammrsatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS
350 (1955); Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS
387 (1954).
48. See OWEN, supra note 47, at 15.
49. C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 494 (3d ed. 1974). See generally J.
BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968); Bator, The Anatomy of a
Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 369-71 (1958); Head & Shoup, Public Goods and Ambigu-
ous Goods, 79 ECON. J. 567 (1969).
50. OWEN, supra note 47, at 15. The marginal cost of consumption by an additional viewer
is to be distinguished from the production costs of attracting an additional viewer. See notes
78-85 and accompanying text infra.
51. OWEN, supra note 47, at 15.
52. See NOLL, supra note 27, at 28; W. VICKREY, MICROSTATISTICS 209 (1964).
53. OWEN, supra note 47, at 15-16.
1979-1980]
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sions concerning how many public goods to produce, and who should
produce them, are best left to the political process. 54  In order to
conform to the efficient pricing criterion of perfect competition, 55
these economists suggest that public goods be provided free of charge
and in sufficient quantity to satisfy demand at the zero price, that
financing be done indirectly through a general increase in taxes, and
that such products be produced by publicly owned producers or by
private producers who are subsidized by the government. 56 Other
economists believe that in this imperfect real world, the less
economic activity with which the government is involved, the bet-
ter. 57 They would sacrifice the efficient pricing requirement of per-
fect competition and would allow real-world competitive markets to
produce such products if at all possible.58
In fact, both approaches are being employed. There is some
tendency to adopt the public ownership or subsidy approach with re-
spect to a) public goods, such as national defense, which are also
54. See, e.g., D. DEWEY, MICROECONOMICS 216-19 (1975); C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE,
supra note 49, at 495; Hotelling, The Relation of Prices to Marginal Costs in an Optimum
System, 7 ECONOMETRICA 151, 151-55 & 158-60 (1939); Hotelling, The General Welfare in
Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242
(1938); Oakland, Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underproduction, 82 J. POL. ECON.
927 (1974).
55. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
56. See, e.g., D. DEWEY, supra note 54, at 219. The public good concept tends to justify
advertiser-supported television since, under that system, it costs an additional viewer nothing
more to receive programs (other than the cost of the electricity to operate the television set and
the set itself). See NOLL, supra note 27, at 28. The analysis, however, is complicated by the
nature of television programs as differentiated products rather than homogeneous goods.
Advertiser-sponsored television produces programs which will attract the largest audience, but
such programming fails to take account of differences in preferences and intensity of demand. In
other words, even though a particular television program may attract a smaller audience, that
audience may value the program more dearly than the larger audience attracted by a second
program. Such variations are not accounted for by advertiser-supported television.
Nevertheless, these diverse preferences could be taken into account by establishing a price
for broadcasts. See Minasian, Television and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J.L. & ECON. 71,
75-76 (1964). But such an approach leads to a dilemma. Efficient resource allocation requires
that the price of a product equal its marginal cost, which in the case of an added telvision
viewer is zero. NOLL, supra note 27, at 28. See text accompanying note 52 supra. On the other
hand, a zero price is inconsistent with the efficient allocation of production resources among the
various types of programs. Furthermore, establishing a price to take account of preferences and
intensity of demand introduces other inefficiencies-e.g., if such a price were to be charged,
viewers willing to pay only a lower price would be excluded, even though to include them
would impose no cost on anyone else. NOLL, supra note 27, at 33; Ohls, Marginal Cost Pricing,
Investment Theory and CATV, 13 J.L. & ECON. 439 (1970).
57. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). Friedman would limit
the government's role in the economic sphere to providing for "the maintenance of law and
order to prevent coercion of one individual by another, the enforcement of contracts voluntarily
entered into, the definition of the meaning of property rights, the interpretation and enforce-
ment of such rights, and the provision of a monetary framework." Id. at 27.
58. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 7-36; Demsetz, The Private Production of Public
Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970); Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production of Public
Goods, 50 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 1 (1968).
[VOL. 25: p. 417
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"collective goods"; 59 and b) public goods, such as general education,
for which there are significant external economies of production or
spillover effects.6 0  On the other hand, there is some tendency to
rely upon the market when products or services, like musical compo-
sitions and video-films, have the public good characteristic, but are
neither collective goods nor goods involving large external economies
of production. 6 ' Even in these areas of market reliance, however,
there is substantial political involvement, both as to the price of final
products and in the distribution of income among those who produce
them.6 2
The Copyright Law of 1976,63 for example, provides in certain
circumstances for compulsory licensing of, and regulation of royalties
payable for, a) the right to record copyrighted musical compositions
on phonorecords, 6 4 and b) the importation of distant television broad-
59. See Buchanan, Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-Sainuelson
Discussion, 10 J.L. & ECON. 193 (1967); Minasian, supra note 26; Mishan, Joint Products,
Collective Goods, and External Effects: Reply, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1141 (1971); Mishan, The
Relationship between Joint Products, Collective Goods, and External Effects, 77 J. POL. ECON.
329 (1969); Samuelson, Public Goods and Subscription TV: Correction of the Record, 72 J.L. &
ECON. 81 (1964). "Collective goods" may be defined as goods which are hard to supply to one
person without also supplying to everyone because of the difficulty of excluding "free riders"-
i.e., those who do not pay. See C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 49, at 494; M.
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1968).
60. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 456-57 (3d ed. 1979).
An external economy occurs when an action taken by an economic unit results in uncom-
pensated benefits to others; when such benefits are due to an increase in a firm's produc-
tion, they are called external economies of production. The firm may benefit others di-
rectly. For example, it may train workers that eventually go to work for other firms that
do not have to pay training costs.... An external diseconomy occurs when an action taken
by an economic unit results in uncompensated costs to others; when such costs are due to
increases in a firm's production, they are called external diseconomies of production. For
example, a firm may pollute a stream by pumping out waste materials, or it may pollute
the air with smoke or materials.
Id. See also Bator, supra note 49, at 369-71. For a general discussion of external effects, see E.
MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 101-80 (2d ed. 1976); Baumol, On Taxation and "The Con-
trol of Externalities," 62 Am. ECON. REv. 307 (1972).
61. For a discussion of the terms "collective goods" and "external economies of production,"
see notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
62. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text infra.
63. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. 1978).
64. See id. §§ 115, 801 (Supp. 1978). Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides for
compulsory licenses for the distribution of phonorecords once phonorecords have been publicly
distributed under the authority of the copyright owner. Id. § 115 (a)(1). The copyright owner is
entitled to royalties on phonorecords distributed under the compulsory license. Id. § 115(c)(1).
Section 115 thus specifies that "[w]ith respect to each work embodied in the phonorecord, the
royalty shall be either two and three-fourths cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of playing
time or fraction thereof, whichever amount is larger." Id. § 115(c)(2). The section also provides
for the time and manner of payment, id. § 115(c)(3), and remedies of the copyright owner upon
default. Id. § 115(c)(4). Under § 801 of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Copyright Royalty Tri-
bunal has the authority to make, in accordance with specified objectives, adjustments in the
royalties payable under § 115. Id. § 801(b). For further discussion of the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, see note 65 infra; note 226 and accompanying text infra.
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cast signals by cable telecasters. 65  With respect to the right of non-
commercial television broadcasters to perform copyrighted musical
compositions, the Copyright Act of 1976 provides for collective bar-
gaining with determination of a license fee by an administrative tri-
bunal should the parties fail to agree. 66 Indeed, the very existence
of copyright protection for the commercial performance of a musical
composition is due to a political decision made by Congress less than
one hundred years ago to allow those who create certain kinds of
works to obtain more than a zero price for their creations. 67
Even if a market approach is adopted for products which have
the public good characteristic, and assuming the market structure is
such that a real-world competitive price and output will result, such
results would have little relation to the perfectly competitive or effi-
cient price and output - i.e., a zero price with unrestricted use. 68
Moreover, it will be argued below that, if the production of a public
good involves a natural monopoly or, at least, substantial concentra-
tion, government intervention is required. 69 Further, it will be
demonstrated that where there is great uncertainty of demand for
public goods at the time when decisions are made to invest in them,
as is the case with respect to video-films, then neither real-world
competitive markets, the efficiency criterion of perfect competition,
nor any other objective criteria exist on which to base government
intervention. 70
Thus, although the public good and natural monopoly concepts
justify government intervention in the determination of price and
output, as well as in other financial matters, it will be shown that
65. See id. §§ 111, 801. Like § 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976, see note 64 supra, § 111
specifies the royalty due the copyright owner on secondary transmissions by cable systems. Id.§ 111(d)(2)(B)-(D). The time and manner of payment are also provided for. Id. § 111(d)(5).
Section 801 of the Act further provides that the Copyright Royalty Tribunal may make adjust-
ments in the royalties due under § 111. Id. § 801(b)(2).
66. 1d. § 118(b). The administrative agency, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, is created by 9
801 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. § 801(a). For other related functions of the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, see notes 64-65 supra. For a discussion of § 118, see Korman, Performance
Rights in Music Under Sections 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV.
521 (1977).
67. Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (repealed 1906) (current version at 17 U.S.C.§9 101-810 (Supp. 1978)).
Congress' power to enact such legislation derives in turn from an earlier decision by the
drafters of the Constitution to include among Congress' enumerated powers the power "To
promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
68. For a discussion of the perfectly competitive or efficient price and output of a public
good, see notes 47-58 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 73-103 and accompanying text infra.
70. See notes 96-103 and accompanying text infra.
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such intervention can only be based on value judgments rather than
objective or impersonal criteria. 71 The inevitable result is that the
various producer and exhibitor interests engage in a great deal of liti-
gation and lobbying for legislation in order to affect the price of the
product and their shares of the income derived from it, or to prevent
change via stalling and stalemate.
C. Natural Monopoly, Substantial Concentration, and Their
Relation to the Public Good Characteristic
The critical characteristic of a natural monopoly is an inherent
tendency toward decreasing unit costs 72 of production as output in-
creases. 73  In other words, unit costs (often called "average total
costs" in economics textbooks) will decline only if more output is con-
centrated in a single producer. 74  The core of the natural monopoly
concept is economies of scale. 75 Because efficiency demands that
there be only one producer rather than the many necessary for a
competitive market, a natural monopoly is often referred to as a mar-
ket failure. 76 If markets fail, government intervention is justified
and often required. 77
A public good involves another type of market failure.78 Recall
that a public good is defined as one for which the marginal cost of
additional consumption is zero up to the limit of capacity. 79 If mar-
ginal cost is zero and the capacity is large or infinite, as with broad-
cast television, unit costs of consumption will decrease as the number
of persons consuming the good increases. On this reasoning, some
71. See notes 72-103 and accompanying text infra.
72. Several different meanings may be attached to the term "decreasing unit costs": 1) short-
run decreasing costs-i.e., when a firm has a given capacity already in being, total unit costs of
production decline as output increases up to, or almost up to, the physical limits of capacity
operation; 2) long-run decreasing costs-i.e., the larger the plant constructed or the larger the
unit of additional capacity put into operation, the lower will be its unit costs if operated to the
capacity for which it was designed; 3) decreasing costs due to economies of scale external to the
firm-i.e., as an entire industry grows it may acquire some of its input at decreasing average
costs because its growth enables the suppliers of its input to take advantage of potential
economies of scale internal to their industries; 4) decreasing costs over time as a result of
technological progress. The phenomenon of long-run decreasing costs due to economies of scale
internal to the firm is the definition to which the concept of natural monopoly is related. See A.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 124-30 (1970); C.
PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 22 (1969).
73. See A. KAHN, supra note 72, at 119. For the conditions necessary for a single firm to
prevent entry into a market in which there are decreasing unit costs, see D. DEWEY, supra note
54, at 114-19; W. VICKREY, supra note 52, at 249-59.
74. See A. KAHN, supra note 72, at 119.
75. See id. at 121-22.
76. See Bator, supra note 49, at 365-69.
77. See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 72, at 21.
78. See Bator, supra note 49, at 369-71.
79. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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economists argue that television broadcasting has the natural
monopoly characteristic.8 0 This conclusion ignores a subtle distinc-
tion between the two concepts: while the natural monopoly concept is
usually defined in terms of the cost of production, the public good
concept is defined in terms of the cost of consumption."' The two
definitions are not strictly commensurate. In order to compare these
definitions, one can define both concepts in terms of the production
process. The natural monopoly characteristic is evident when viewing
the production process ex ante, the public good characteristic is evi-
dent when viewing the production process ex poste. Using television
as an example, this distinction is easily clarified.
Viewing the production process ex poste, once a program's pro-
duction costs are incurred and it is broadcast, the television network
incurs no cost when an additional viewer watches. The marginal cost
of production, in other words, is zero. Thus, television is a public
good.8 2 Since the total cost of production is already determined, the
proportion of that cost incurred to service each viewer decreases in-
definitely as the number of viewers increases. Accepting this analysis,
some have concluded that network television exhibits the natural
monopoly characteristic.8 3
Viewing the production process ex ante, however, it may be ar-
gued that additional viewers can only be attracted by spending more
on television programs. Thus, the marginal cost of producing the
programs is greater than zero, and networks will spend more to in-
crease the size of the audience until advertising revenue from an ad-
ditional viewer equals the cost of attracting that viewer.8 4 This
analysis, therefore, indicates that network television broadcasting is
not a natural monopoly because it implies that unit production costs
may not decrease indefinitely as the number of viewers increases.8 5
80. See G. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY 95 (1971); NOLL, supra note 27, at 33.
81. See notes 72-73 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 72-80 and accompanying text supra.
84. See NOLL, supra note 27, at 10-11.
85. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra. Such an analysis may also be applied to
motion pictures and musical compositions. Viewed ex poste, once the large production costs of a
motion picture are incurred, it costs no more to supply each additional viewer until the capacity
of the theatre is reached. Thus, the cost of production per viewer decreases indefinitely as the
number of viewers who attend the movie increases. Motion pictures, therefore, would appear to
have the natural monopoly characteristic. Viewed ex ante, however, if larger audiences can be
attracted only by spending more in production, then the marginal cost of production is greater
than zero. Thus, under this view, motion pictures do not have the natural monopoly characteris-
tic.
The same analysis may be applied to musical compositions by noting that the cost of the
composition is incurred by the composer in the time and effort spent in creating it. By analogiz-
ing this cost to that of the television networks or motion picture producers in producing video-
films, the analysis employed in this footnote and the accompanying text may lead to the same
disparate results regarding musical compositions.
[VOL. 25: p. 417
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Whether or not network television is a natural monopoly, the
networks do, in fact, have great monopoly and monopsony power.8 6
Much of their power results from the scarcity of frequencies avail-
able in the radio frequency spectrum and the policies of the FCC. In
the early days of television, the FCC decided to allow very high fre-
quency channels (VHF) and ultra high frequency channels (UHF) to
compete in the same television markets rather than reserve different
markets for each.8 7  Since VHF broadcast signals travel farther and
give a clearer picture than the UHF signals, UHF channels cannot
compete effectively with VHF channels. 88 In addition, because of
the scarcity of frequencies, the FCC assigned only three commercial
channels to five large markets.8 9 These actions effectively ensured
that there would be only three national networks. 90 Moreover, these
measures were buttressed by other rules promulgated by the FCC
restricting the number of distant signals which cable telecasters could
import and the types of programs they could telecast. 91
Nevertheless, even if network television is not a natural
monopoly and even if the FCC had not taken such actions as inter-
mingling UHF and VHF stations, a tendency toward substantial con-
centration may be intrinsic to network television because of the high
cost of producing prime time network shows. 92 With respect to
advertiser-supported television, the funds available to produce such
costly shows are a function of the size of the audience. 93 Only na-
86. NOLL, supra note 27, at 10 n.26. A monopsonist, or single buyer, is the counterpart of a
monopolist, or single seller. When a buyer can force down the price of whatever he buys by
buying less or threatening to do so, he is regarded as having monopsony power, just as when a
seller can force up the price of whatever he sells by selling less, he is regarded as having
monopoly power. D. DEWEY, supra note 54, at 197-98. J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
IMPERFECT COMPETITION 216 (1934).
87. OWEN, supra note 47, at 121-22; Pearson, supra note 22, at 801; Note, UHF and the
FCC: The Search for a Television Allocations Policy, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 399 (1976).
88. An FCC rule requiring cable systems to carry all locally originated television broadcast
signals neutralizes VHF's signal strength advantage over UHF with respect to cable television
subscribers. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.57-.63 (1979). This somewhat offsets the competitive damage
done to small UHF stations by cable systems when the latter further fragment the audience by
importing distant program signals. Park, supra note 22, at 208.
89. Pearson, supra note 22, at 802. The five markets were Boston, Cleveland, Detroit,
Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Cable Television Order and Report, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). For a discussion of
FCC restrictions on cable television's growth and competition with broadcast television, see
notes 231-56 and accompanying text infra.
92. In the early 1970's, the Columbia Broadcasting System paid about $200,000 for each
one-hour variety show or dramatic special, and as much as $750,000 for a made-for-TV movie.
CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 743
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub nolr. Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). For a discussion of television program production, see
NOLL, supra note 27, at 44-49; OWEN, supra note 47, at 37-48.
93. NOLL, supra note 27, at 5.
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tional networks and a few local stations in large markets would be
able to generate audiences large enough to support such shows.9 4
The video-film industry contains several other areas in which
monopoly power, or something close to it, might be exercised. The
substantial concentration in motion picture production gives the pro-
ducers monopoly power in bargaining with theater owners over exhi-
bition rights. 95 The right of performing rights societies to renegotiate
their shares in the profits from existing video-films to be used on
television gives them effective monopoly power. 96 And local cable
television has the same power since it clearly has the natural
monopoly characteristic. 9 7
In a competitive rather than a concentrated market, the public
good and uncertainty of demand characteristics of video-films may not
require a great deal of government intervention with respect to price
or income distribution: the seller will not be able to demand the
monopoly price or to shift the risk of loss forward, nor will a buyer
have monopoly power to appropriate all profit above production costs
or to shift the risk of loss backward. The public good characteristic of
video-films, however, may place stringent requirements on the
number of firms necessary for workable competition."8 That is, un-
less there are a great many alternative sellers and buyers, the fact
that the marginal cost of video-films is zero99 may allow significant
exploitation to occur at levels of concentration which would be in-
nocuous in industries in which marginal cost rises in conformity with
the usual textbook assumption of the law of diminishing returns.100 If
94. The uncertain impact of cable television also makes it difficult to determine whether
substantial concentration is inherent in network television. On the one hand, satellite transmis-
sion of microwave signals is much cheaper than terrestrial transmission and is becoming still
cheaper; thus, cable television networks will be economically feasible and possibly competitive
with network broadcasting. R. STANLEY, supra note 40, at 270-74; Epstein & Cass, Cable-
Satellite Networks: Structure and Problems, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 692, 694 (1975); Smith,
Television Enters the 80's, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 16. On the other
hand, the public good characteristic and scale economies inherent in prime time shows may be
enough to prohibit a "workably" competitive market structure. For a discussion of the notion of
a workably competitive market structure, see Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competi-
tion, 30 AM. ECON. REv. 241 (1940); Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of
Workable Competition, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1950).
95. For a discussion of the power of motion picture producers, see notes 145-65 and accom-
panying text infra.
96. For a discussion of the monopoly power of performing rights societies, see notes 166-230
and accompanying text infra.
97. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 145 (1972); GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
STUDY, supra note 27, at 350.
98. See note 94 supra.
99. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
100. "The law of diminishing returns states that if increasing quantities of a variable factor are
applied to a given quantity of fixed factors, the marginal product and the average product of the
variable factor will eventually decrease." R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 170 (5th ed.
1978). For further discussion of the law of diminishing returns, see D. DEWEY, supra note 54,
at 71-75; R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra, at 170; W. VICKREY, supra note 52, at 214.
[VOL. 2,5: p. 417
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this supposition is true, substantial government involvement in the
determination of price and income distribution in this industry will be
necessary, even if the number of firms is such that market structure
is workably competitive by the usual standards.
Assuming real-world competitive markets are unworkable be-
cause of the natural monopoly characteristic or are undesirably ineffi-
cient because of the public good characteristic, it may be suggested
that the theory of public utility regulation provides the only objective
criterion upon which to base government intervention. 10 1 If this
theory is not applicable, then no objective criteria exist upon which
to base such intervention.
The theory employed with respect to public utilities, which are
the paradigmatic regulated industries, is that when demand for a
product or service is reasonably certain, price can be set to bring in
enough revenue to cover current costs, replace depreciated capital,
and earn a fair rate of return on invested capital.' 02 Thus, the ability
to accurately forecast demand becomes crucial, so that the amount of
invested capital necessary to satisfy demand can be determined. In
the case of public utilities like gas, electricity, water, and telephone
service, demand is reasonably certain and stable, and the product is
relatively homogeneous. In the video-film industry, however, there is
a) substantial uncertainty of demand prior to production, b) significant
product differentiation, and c) great disparity in financial returns on
investment."l 3 Hence, the public utility regulation model cannot be
used as a basis for government intervention in this industry. Lacking
workably competitive markets or objective criteria with respect to
price, output, and the distribution of income, government interven-
tion in the video-film industry must be based upon value judgments
and naked political power.
D. The Common Product Characteristic
As discussed above, the public good, natural monopoly, and un-
certainty of demand characteristics of video-films justify government
intervention in the setting of prices and the distribution of income,
but do not provide objective criteria for such intervention. 10 4 This
problem is exacerbated by the common product characteristic of
101. For a discussion of the theory of public utility regulation, see generally R. LIPSEY & P.
STEINER, supra note 100, at 298-302.
102. For a discussion of utility rate structures, see A. KAHN, supra note 72, at 25-57; C.
PHILLIPS, supra note 72, at 303-45; C. WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, supra note 14, at 321-43.
103. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text supra.
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video-films-i.e., much of the same artistic material can be shown in
motion picture theaters, on cable television, or on television broad-
casting networks. The cost of the video-film is thus a type of common
or overhead cost 10 5 which should be shared by all three types of
exhibitors in proportions reflected in market prices. In the absence of
government intervention of some sort, interests within the video-film
industry having monopoly power could conceivably shift the burden
of the costs of production to other interests without such power, re-
sulting in an inequitable distribution of revenue. Government inter-
vention with respect to price and output in one or more of these
markets will affect 1) competition among the three types of exhibition;
2) the amount of revenue derived from video-films; 3) the distribution
of this revenue among the various producer and exhibitor groups; and
4) consumer welfare.
III. THE FIVE CONFLICTS
A. Video-Film Producers Versus Television Networks
and Motion Picture Theatres
The video-film producers are involved in conflicts with two types
of exhibitors of their programs: television networks10 6 and motion pic-
ture theaters. 10 7 These conflicts center on how the risk of loss and
the financial returns in excess of production and distribution costs
105. Regarding firms which produce multiple products, economists distinguish between joint
products and common products. A. KAHN, supra note 72, at 77. Products are joint when an
increase in production of one product causes an increase in the output of another product-i.e.,
products which are produced in fixed proportions. Id. at 78. For example, wool and mutton are
joint products from sheep. In the long run, the proportions of most joint products can be
varied. Id. at 79. In the sheep example, the animals may be bred to have more or less wool.
When products are truly joint, they can be produced only in fixed proportions and the costs
they share cannot be separated. Id.
In contrast, when multiple products can be produced in variable proportions, they are
called common products. Id. at 78. An example is a factory which can produce all tables, all
chairs, or some combination of both. If proportions are variable, one can often identify the
marginal cost of any one product as the addition to total cost of the common production process
occasioned by increasing the output of that one product while holding the output of the others
unchanged. Id. at 79. See also J. DEAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 317-19 (1959). One study has
indicated:
The most extreme case of variable proportions . . . occurs when two or more products of
one enterprise are technically completely independent (that is, where changes in the out-
put of one have no necessary connection with the quantity of the other or others). The
costs that are common to such products are often called "overhead costs." The retailer
who makes many goods available to consumers in the same place and at the same time is
an example of a seller of many independent goods with common costs, i.e., "overhead,"
in the rent of his store and the services of his sales clerks.
M. BOWMAN & G. BACH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 253 n.2 (1944).
106. See notes 114-44 and accompanying text infra.
107. See notes 145-65 and accompanying text infra.
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should be apportioned. In one dispute, the government sued the
networks in the interest of the video-film producers alleging that the
three networks use their monopsony power to reduce the financial
returns to video-film producers in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.' 08 The government and one of the networks entered
into a consent decree to which the video-film producers took excep-
tion 1 09 because, inter alia, it contained a provision allowing the net-
work to demand four-year options on exclusive television exhibition
rights to new television series. 110 According to the video-film pro-
ducers, four-year options unjustly bind them far into the future be-
fore the value of a series can be established."'
The second conflict involves the question whether many of these
same producers - who object to being contractually bound to the
networks before the value of their product is determined- should be
allowed to demand that owners of motion picture theatres bid on the
right to exhibit a picture without being given a chance to view it
prior to bidding. Thus, in the part of the exhibition market in which
the Major film producers have monopoly power over motion picture
theatres, 1 2 they are demanding not only that the theatre owners bid
108. United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,503, 73,504-06 (C.D. Cal.),
approving consent decree entered in United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855, at
73,580 (C.D. Cal.). For §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). For further
discussion of this case and the underlying dispute, see note 15 supra; notes 125-40 and accom-
panying text infra.
109. Public comment concerning the proposed consent decree was considered by the court
pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976). See notes 130-36
and accompanying text infra.
110. United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,508-14 (C.D. Cal.), approv-
ing consent decree entered in United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855, at 73,580
(C.D. Cal.). In their comments submitted in opposition to the proposed consent judgment, the
video-film producers also objected on the following grounds: 1) the inadequacy of the restric-
tions on internal production of television programs by the networks; 2) the inadequacy of the
restrictions on exclusive network rights to programs and talent; and 3) the failure to delay
effectiveness of the decree until agreements were reached with the Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem (CBS) and the American Broadcasting Company (ABC). Id. at 73,509-11. Other parties
objecting to various terms of the decree were CBS and ABC, the pay cable television industry,
and various public interest groups. Id. at 73,511-14. See also notes 130-36 and accompanying
text infra.
111. Id. at 73,510.
112. See generally Harmetz, supra note 7. Seven of the major producer-distributors ac-
counted for 70-83% of the gross income from film distribution in the United States and Canada
between 1970 and 1974. T. BALIO, supra note 41, at 461 (Table 1). These same seven produc-
ers, however, accounted for only 36-51% of the prime time series on network television during
the same period. OWEN, supra note 47, at 29. The individual shares are quite small and vol-
atile, and the rank size of major producers changes from year to year. Id. Whereas the major
film producers completely dominate film production, the television market for video-films is
much less concentrated and has been described as monopolistically competitive. Id. at 17. The
difference in concentration is easily explained. Oligopolies frequently exist in industries in
which there are economies of scale which are large relative to the market. The public good
aspect of video-films means that there are scale economies in distribution from inventory
economies and density-of-outlet phenomena. In broadcasting, these distribution economies do
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on a picture before its true worth has been established, but also that
the theater owners be deprived of a chance to judge the picture's
worth for themselves before bidding. 113
1. Video-Filn Producers Versus the Networks
Both the FCC and the Department of Justice have attempted, by
rulemaking 114 and a Sherman Act suit 115 respectively, to reduce the
monopsony power of the networks vis-h-vis video-film producers. It is
not clear that either attempt has been successful.
In 1970, the FCC promulgated three rules with respect to the
relations between the networks and video-film producers: 1) the fi-
nancial interest rule; 116 2) the syndication rule, 117 and 3) the prime-
time access rule. 118
The financial interest rule states that no television network shall
acquire any financial or proprietary right or interest in a television
program produced by a person other than the television network it-
self, except that it may acquire a license or other exclusive right to
network exhibition of such programs.119 The FCC had found a direct
relationship between new programs chosen for network schedules and
network acquisition of subsidiary rights and interests. 120 The Com-
mission concluded that the networks were using their monopsony
power to obtain financial interests in programs produced by others
and, thus, were excluding wholly independent producers from the
market. 121
The second FCC rule involves syndication, which is the distribu-
tion of video-films to individual stations for nonnetwork television
broadcasting. 122 The rule prohibits a television network from selling,
not require large firms (in fact, many different-sized firms coexist) because the networks capture
the economic advantages of distribution economies. This is not true in film distribution which is
dominated by the major producers who have integrated production and distribution. Id. at 28.
113. For further discussion of the conflict over "blind bidding," see notes 145-65 and accom-
panying text infra.
114. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1979); notes 116-24 and accompanying text infra.
115. See United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,503 (C.D. Cal.); notes
108-11 and accompanying text supra; notes 125-40 and accompanying text infra.
116. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(ii) (1979). See also Mount Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442
F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding the rule as promulgated).
117. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(i) 1979. See also Mount Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d
470 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding the rule as promulgated).
118. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1979). See also Mount Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470
(2d Cir. 1971) (upholding the rule as promulgated).
119. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(ii) (1979).
120. See Mount Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 485 (2d Cir. 1971).
121. See id. See also Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d
382 (1970) (report and order).
122. For further explanation of syndication, see Mount Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d
470 (2d Cir. 1971).
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licensing, or distributing television programs of which it is not the
sole producer. 123  This rule is logically inherent in the financial in-
terest rule since the right to syndicate and receive a fee for such
services is the right to a particular financial interest.
The prime-time access rule states that no television station in the
top fifty markets shall broadcast more than three hours of network
programs during the hours between 7:00 and 11:00 p.m. 124 By man-
dating one hour of nonnetwork programing, this rule prevents the
networks from avoiding the other two rules by simply refusing to buy
programs from outside sources or by threatening to do so.
In 1972, the Department of Justice brought an antitrust suit
seeking to strengthen these rules. 125  In 1977, the government and
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) signed a consent decree
which paralleled the FCC's three rules but was more detailed. 126 The
consent decree won court approval 127 but not before serious objec-
tions were raised (and rejected) concerning the provisions in the de-
cree limiting the duration of options by which the network acquires
exclusive rights to a television program or series.' 28  This issue is
crucial to the determination of whether the networks can take advan-
tage of their monopsony power over video-film producers. In most
cases, option contracts between television networks and producers of
123. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(i) (1979).
124. Id. § 73.658(k).
125. See United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,503, 73,504-06 (C.D.
Cal.) approving consent decree entered in United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855,
at 73,580 (C.D. Cal.). The government first filed separate but similar complaints against the
American Broadcasting Company, the Columbia Broadcasting System, and the National Broad-
casting Company in April, 1972. See id. $ 61,842, at 73,504. The original actions were dismissed
without prejudice on November 13, 1974, for failure of the plaintiff to comply with court orders.
See id. The government filed new complaints on December 10, 1974, alleging the same viola-
tions of the Sherman Act. See id.
126. See United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855, at 73,580 (C.D. Cal.). In one
respect, the consent decree appeared to be even more restrictive than the FCC rules: the
decree prohibited NBC from producing more than 2 hours of prime-time programming per
week. Id. at 73,582. In contrast, the FCC prime-time access rule merely prohibits broadcasting
network television programs-all of which, under the rule, could conceivably be produced by
the network itself-for more than three of the four daily hours of prime time. 47 C.F.R. §
73.658(k) (1979). This restriction, however, placed no substantial burden on NBC, since the
network was then only producing one prime-time series consuming one hour per week. [1978] 1
Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,509, approving consent decree entered in United States v. NBC,
[1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855, at 73,580 (C.D. Cal.).
In addition, although the prime-time access rule does not mention, let alone regulate,
network production of programming for the remaining hours of the day, see 47 C.F.B. §
73.658(k) (1979), the NBC consent decree also defined "daytime hours," and "fringe hours,"
limiting the number of those hours for which NBC could produce its own programs. See [1978]
1 Trade Cas., 61,855, at 73,581-82 (consent decree).
127. See United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,503 (C. D. Cal.), approv-
ing consent decree entered in United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855, at 73,580
(C.D. Cal.).
128. See id. 61,842, at 73,509-10; notes 110-11 and accompanying text supra.
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a series of programs are entered into before the programs have been
developed. Thus, if the networks can successfully demand that a low
price, agreed upon when the worth of the program is uncertain, be
maintained through option contracts for a number of years even
though the program is later found to be more valuable, the network
stands to gain the entire profit while the producer bears the entire
risk of loss.
The government originally sought a two-year limit on options
which a network could acquire, but was apparently forced to com-
promise and accept a four-year limit in order to convince NBC to
accept the consent decree. 129 In proceedings under the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act 130 in which the court heard comments
upon the proposed consent decree, the video-film producers objected
that the four-year limit was too long. 131 The other two major com-
mercial networks, the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC), opposed the four-year time
limit as being too short. 132 With supporting affidavits from an
economist' 33 and a professor of law, 13 4 they argued that placing a
time limit on options which networks can purchase prevents produc-
ers from realizing the value of their video-films at an early date. 135
They further asserted that such a restriction would force out of com-
petition small independent producers who are not in a position to
absorb costs of production without the quick realization of the full
exploitation value of a program or series. 136
129. See id. at 73,510. NBC was also allowed to renegotiate a single year's extension of the
contract after the first broadcast. Id. See also id. 61,855, at 73,583 (consent decree).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976). The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act provides for 1) public
notice of the terms and effects of consent decrees proposed in antitrust cases, and 2) considera-
tion of public comment on the proposed decree. See id. § 16(b)(c). The Attorney General must
consider and respond to any public comment received. Id. § 16(d). The court may enter the
proposed consent judgment only upon a finding that its entry is "'in the public interest." Id. §
16(e)-(f).
131. United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,510 (C.D. Cal.), approving
consent decree entered in United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855, at 73,580 (C.D.
Cal.).
132. Id. 61,842, at 73,512.
133. Affidavit of Franklin M. Fisher, 42 Fed. Reg. 25,199 (1977).
134. Affidavit of Richard A. Posner, 42 Fed. Reg. 25,231 (1977). See also Crandall, FCC
Regulation, Monopsony, and Network Television Costs, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI.
483 (1972), reprinted in 42 Fed. Reg. 25,215 (1977).
135. United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,842, at 73,512 (C.D. Cal.), approving
consent decree entered in United States v. NBC, [1978] 1 Trade Cas. 61,855, at 73,580 (C.D.
Cal.).
136. Id. 61,842, at 73,512. The court noted that there was a factual dispute arising from
these conflicting positions. Id. at 73,510. The government contended that the networks obtained
initial exclusive exhibition options of six or seven years, and, therefore, characterized the relief
as substantial. Id. On the other hand, the video-filn producers contended that industry practice
was to obtain options of only five years and, thus, the four-year limitation ought not to be
considered substantial. Id. The court did not attempt to resolve this dispute.
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The position taken by CBS and ABC is based upon questionable
assumptions. First, the argument assumes that the ability to sell a
long term option is more valuable to the producers than the ability to
sell a short term option with the possibility of reaping higher profits
in renegotiating rights to the program when its value is later proven.
It is quite possible and probable, however, that the networks' monop-
sony power, which allows them to demand options on long term ex-
clusive exhibition contracts, depresses the total value of programs and
series substantially below the value which they would have in a com-
petitive market or in a market in which exclusive exhibition contracts
are negotiated on an annual basis. In this respect, the networks' ar-
gument is similar to the argument made for baseball's reserve
clause. 137 Baseball club owners contended that because they were
assuming the risk of loss and the costs of developing quality
ballplayers, they were justified in requiring players to sign long term
exclusive contracts. 138 Many economists believe that the costs in-
curred by the owners due to player development and risk assumption
are outweighed by the increase in their profits due to the monopsony
power inherent in the reserve clause to depress salaries. 139
The networks' argument also assumes that there are no risk tak-
ers other than the networks willing to finance video-film producers.
Even accepting such an implausible assumption, if the length of time
for which options on exclusive exhibition rights can be negotiated
were shortened, thereby reducing the networks' monopsony power,
other risk takers would be encouraged to finance productions because
of the possibility of greater profits.' 40
There is yet another possible flaw in the networks' argument. If
the networks were not constrained by the FCC's financial interest
rule, over time they could profit from their monopsony power by
agreeing to nonexclusive exhibition contracts while demanding a per-
centage of the profits from syndication, broadcasts in foreign nations,
137. See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (holding that Congress did not intend to include the business
of baseball within the scope of the antitrust laws even though it is engaged in interstate com-
merce; thus, baseball's reserve clause could not be held to violate those laws).
138. See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
139. Noll, Major League Team Sports, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 365,
366-71, 381-87 (5th ed. W. Adams 1977); Rottenberg, The Baseball Players Labor Markets, 64
J. POL. ECON. 242, 252-54 (1956); Scully, Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball, 64
AM. ECON. REv. 915, 927-29 (1974).
140. Such investment could be further enhanced by granting video-film producers full
copyright protection with respect to distant signal importation by cable telecasters, thereby
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and other ancillary financial interests. It may be that by demanding
long term exclusive exhibition contracts, the networks achieve the
same financial rewards through the presumably higher advertising
rates charged on exclusive broadcasts and the money saved by not
having to pay more for the exclusive rights. just as one can capitalize
the value of future income one is to receive from an income-
producing asset, one can capitalize the value of money one does not
have to pay periodically for the exclusive right to use an income-
producing asset. Thus, allowing networks to demand four-year exclu-
sive exhibition options probably allows them to reap substantial ben-
efits from their monopsony power over video-filn producers.
Nevertheless, even in a competitive television market for video-
films, producers would not wish to prohibit exclusive exhibition
contracts completely.141 When not coerced by excessive market
power on the buyer's side, exclusive exhibition contracts allow pro-
ducers to engage in a form of temporal price discrimination which is
both legal and beneficial to the producers. By making available an
exclusive right of exhibition on the first run, the producer should be
able to command a higher price from the network than he would if
that exhibitor knew that others would be competing for the first-run
audience. On later runs, the producer would settle for a lower price,
as networks would not expect to be able to charge advertisers as
much for a video-film which is no longer novel. In effect, the pro-
ducer can thereby charge more to those willing to pay more and
charge less to those seeking to pay less.
In the same way, book publishers sell the hard cover edition at a
substantially higher price than subsequent sales of soft cover or
paperback books a year or so later. First-run motion picture theaters
charge higher prices than second-run or neighborhood theaters which
show the same films at later dates. In a competitive market, the pro-
ducer of a video-film series would wish to be able to engage in this
legal form of price discrimination rather than be required to exhibit
the series simultaneously in many outlets.
It has already been suggested that the combined effect of the
four characteristics of video-films indicates that any government in-
tervention in this industry is arbitrary-i.e., not based on economic
141. But see Chazen & Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83
HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1833 (1969). The authors of the Harvard article argue that program pro-
ducers have no interest in exclusive exhibition contracts, and that only inertia and pressure from
networks causes them to enter into such contracts. Id. The authors, however, do not discuss
and, thus, appear to overlook the point that the sale of exclusive exhibition contracts permits
producers to engage in advantageous temporal price discrimination. See text accompanying and
following this footnote.
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efficiency determined by the market - and therefore must be based
instead wholly upon considerations of equity. 142 Considering the
monopsony power of the major television networks1 43 over video-film
producers for the duration of option contracts, 144 substantial restric-
tions should be placed on the permissible time limit of exclusive
exhibition options. The Department of Justice's original proposal of a
two-year time limit would seem to be appropriate.
2. Film Producers Versus Motion Picture Theatres
Prior to United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 145 film pro-
ducers owned interests in many of the nation's theaters.146 In 1945,
theatres owned or controlled by the five major producers accounted
for approximately 45% of the domestic film rentals. 147  The
Paramount decision in 1946, however, required the major producers
to sever connections with theater chains.148 As a result of this deci-
sion, the major filmmakers are vertically integrated with respect to
finance, production, and distribution, but not exhibition.
Theatres bid for the right to exhibit motion pictures. Between
1972 and 1975, pictures were routinely offered with forty-eight-hour
cancellation clauses.149 After seeing a film, theater owners had
142. See notes 98-104 and accompanying text supra.
143. NOLL, supra note 27, at 16-17; OWEN, supra note 47, at 11, 121.
144. Some writers have stated that once the option for exclusive exhibition rights expires, the
market shifts from a monopsony to a monopoly. NOLL, supra note 27, at 45; Fastow, supra note
24, at 529-30. This rather loose use of the term monopoly is technically incorrect and produces
a misleading impression. The terms monopoly and monopsony refer to market structure-the
number of sellers and buyers in an industry-and not to the fact that one of many sellers of a
differentiated product may sell a product or service which is highly valued by buyers. A video-
film producer who owns a popular series which commands a high price has no more monopoly
power than does a professional athlete whose services are in great demand. In terms of
economic theory, both merely earn a high economic rent, which is the return on a product
whose supply is fixed. A monopolist, on the other hand, is able to charge a high price by
intentionally restricting supply. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 100, at 380; OWEN,
supra note 47, at 30, 37-48.
145. 334 U.S. 131 (1948). In Paramount, the United States alleged that a number of practices
in the motion picture industry violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
344 U.S. at 140-41.
146. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 353-56 (S.D.N.Y.)
(opinion on the merits), 70 F. Supp. 53, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and decree), aff d in part, revd and remanded in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). The district
court distinguished between 1) theaters owned solely by producers, 2) theaters owned jointly by
two or more producers, and 3) theaters owned jointly by a producer and an independent owner.
70 F. Supp. at 67. Although the district court held, inter alia, that only sole ownership by a
producer was legal, 66 F. Supp. at 355-56; 70 F. Supp. at 72, the Supreme Court ruled that
joint ownership by a producer and an independent was also legal unless shown to be an un-
reasonable restraint of trade. 344 U.S. at 152-53. On remand, the district court held that all
ownership of theatres by producers-distributors was an unreasonable restraint of trade. 85 F.
Supp. 881, 893-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
147. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 262 (1959).
148. See 85 F. Supp. at 895; note 146 supra.
149. Harmetz, supra note 7, § C, at 7, col. 4.
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forty-eight hours in which to cancel their bids. 150 In recent years,
only one major video-film producer allowed the forty-eight-hour
clause, and that producer ceased to use it when many theaters can-
celled several of its pictures. 151
Currently, film producers require motion picture exhibitors to
acquiesce in blind bidding. 152 Bids are based upon titles, cast, plot-
line, and availability dates of films. 153 In addition, the film produc-
ers often require exhibitors to agree to nonrefundable guarantees. 154
Although it is not clear whether and to what extent there would be
nonrefundable guarantees in a competitive market, 155 the practice of
blind bidding is anticompetitive by nature since any reasonable defi-
nition of a competitive market assumes that both buyers and sellers
have substantial knowledge concerning all relevant aspects of the
product and market. 156 The existence of blind bidding is in itself
evidence that the ten major film producers have substantial monopoly
power over the several thousand motion picture exhibitors. 157
The uncertainty of demand characteristic of video-films 158 im-
plies that a substantial portion of the costs of production are incurred
before it is known whether demand will be sufficient to recoup pro-
duction costs and earn a profit. Thus, the crucial question is how the
risk of loss and the financial returns in excess of production costs
should be apportioned. Blind bidding is an attempt by those with
market power to keep exhibitors ignorant in order to shift a greater
portion of the risk of loss to them than they would bear in a competi-
tive market. This practice makes exhibitors unwilling speculators on
high risk investments. Such a high pressure climate is not conducive
to independent theater ownership and, in general, only large chains
are operating profitably.1 59  Since only the major film producers have
the market power to demand blind bidding, the practice results in
150. Id.
151. Id. See also W. HURST & W. HALE, MOTION PICTURE DISTRIBUTION: BUSINESS
AND/OR RACKET 33-36 (1975).
152. See Note, Blind Bidding and the Motion Picture Industry, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1128, 1128
(1979).
153. See id. at 1131-32.
154. See id. at 1130. "A guarantee is a minimum rental fee which the exhibitor will pay
regardless of admissions revenue." Id.
155. In a competitive market, certain films might be able to command nonrefundable guaran-
tees because of the reputations of the producers, directors, writers, or actors.
156. C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 49, at 236; McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:
The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, in E. MANSFIELD, supra note 60, at 248.
157. See Harmetz, supra note 7, § C, at 7, col. 5; Note, supra note 152, at 1129.
158. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text supra.
159. Letter from John H. Shenefield, Assistant United States Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, to Representative David J. Swartz, Massachusetts Honse of Representatives (April 21,
1978). The letter states in pertinent part:
[VOL. 25: p. 417
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lower costs and risks for them than for those borne by companies
producing fewer films; therefore, the practice probably inhibits entry
into the market of movie producers. 160 Similarly, although non-
refundable guarantees may occur in a competitive market, the appar-
ent monopoly power of film producers may enable them to demand
guarantees which are much larger than those available in a competi-
tive market. In view of the apparent power of the film producers, the
policy of preserving competition which lies behind the antitrust
laws, 161 and the lack of objective pricing criteria to be found in a
competitive market, nonrefundable guarantees should also be prohib-
ited or sharply restricted.
At least fifteen states have passed laws forbidding blind bid-
ding. 162 Besides prohibiting distributors from engaging in blind bid-
ding, these laws prevent them from demanding advances or non-
refundable guarantees. 163 The Motion Picture Association of
America, which represents the film producers, is currently challeng-
ing Ohio's anti-blind-bidding law as an unconstitutional regulation of
interstate commerce. 164 Although one commentator has suggested
that such laws are indeed unconstitutional as well as unwise, 165 the
evident strength of the producers' monopoly power seems to compel
the adoption of these laws, if not by the states, then by the federal
government.
The bargaining strength of the exhibitors vis a vis the distributors is weak. Blind bidding
requires exhibitors to formulate their bids without sufficient data on which to make an
informed judgment as to the quality, artistic merit, or probable box office appeal of the
preferred products.... Since an exhibitor is reduced to the role of a speculator on high
risk investments, it is not at all suprising that in general only the large chains are still
operating profitably.
Id. The letter also notes that "blind bidding may lessen competitive pressures for the produc-
tion of quality films" and "inhibit entry into the market." Id.
160. See note 159 supra.
161. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-77 (1966).
162. Harmetz, supra note 7. The Pennsylvania state legislature recently passed a bill which
would prohibit blind bidding and non-refundable guarantees. Feature Motion Picture Fair Bus-
iness Practices Law, Act No. 1980-14, §§ 1-12, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 31 (to be codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 203-1 to -11). See Bill OK'd to End Getting Movies Sight Unseen,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 13, 1980, § E, at 1, col. 5. For further examples of anti-blind-
bidding laws, see, e.g., Alabama Motion Picture Fair Competition Act, ALA. CODE §§ 8-18-1 to
-6 (Supp. 1979); Georgia Motion Picture Fair Competition Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 106-1301 to
-1305 (Supp. 1979); Motion Picture Fair Bidding Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7701 to -7708 (Supp.
1979); Virginia Motion Picture Fair Competition Act, VA. CODE §§ 59.1-255 to -261 (Supp.
1979).
163. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.06 (Page 1979).
164. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, No. C-2-78-1031 (S.D. Ohio, filed Oct. 4,
1978) (complaint seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief). The statute at issue in this
litigation is OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.05-07 (Page 1979). The district court recently de-
nied the defendant state officers' motion to dismiss the complaint or alternatively to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
165. Note, supra note 152, at 1139-47.
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B. Composers of Music Versus Video-Film Producers
and Television Networks
There are two major antitrust cases involving composers suing
and being sued by video-filn producers and television networks. 166
In order to understand these complex cases, a brief background of the
relations between composers and video-film producers is neces-
sary. 167 The Copyright Act of 1897168 granted composers an exclu-
sive right in the public performance for profit of their work. 169 Be-
cause of the number of theaters, cabarets, hotels, and restaurants
using their compositions, composers soon found the task of enforcing
this right to be beyond their capacity. 1 70  The American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), a so-called performing
rights society, was formed in 1914 in order to finance a staff of "music
police" who would systematically investigate establishments in which
music is played to detect copyright infringements. 171 Under this sys-
tem, composers grant ASCAP a nonexclusive right to license others to
perform their compositions. 172 ASCAP, acting as an agent, 173 then
licenses musical compositions under a blanket license which permits
the user to perform any or all of ASCAP's compositions. 174 In terms
166. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that blanket licensing of musical compositions used in television pro-
grams did not violate the antitrust laws), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that blan-
ket licensing constituted price fixing and was therefore a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)), rev'd and remalded sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that the use of blanket licenses was not per se unlawful and remanding to
consider the legality of such licenses under the rule of reason); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures,
Inc., 379 F. Supp 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (dismissing antitrust suit on the ground that the claims
lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board), rev'd and re-
manded, 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975) (remanding for reconsideration of the jurisdictional issue).
For a discussion of Broadcast Music, Inc., see notes 209-25 infra. For a discussion of Bernstein,
see notes 189-208 infra.
167. For a further discussion of the conflict between composers and video-film producers, see
Cirace, supra note 23.
168. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (amending 40 REv. STAT. § 4966) (repealed 1906)
(current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. 1978)).
169. Id.
170. See CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp 737,
741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub non. Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. .CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
171. Allen, The Battle of Tin Pan Alley, 181 HARPERS 514, 521 (Oct. 1940); Finklestein,
ASCAP as an Example of the Clearing House System in Operation, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
2 (1966); 5,000,000 Songs, FORTUNE, Jan. 1933, at 27.
172. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub nora. Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
173. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), revd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub nora. Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 1979).
174. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), revd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub non. Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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of economic analysis, the collective selling of the right to perform
musical compositions gives composers a great deal of monopoly
power.
In 1946, ASCAP sought to increase its revenue from licenses on
compositions used in motion pictures. 175 The rates then in effect
were set in fixed dollar terms and had remained unchanged since
1933.176 A contract due to expire in 1947 required each theatre
exhibitor to pay ASCAP a graduated annual license fee which was
computed according to the number of seats in the exhibitor's
theatre. 177 ASCAP proposed to substitute a system in which each
theatre paid a standard portion of its gross revenue. 178  Although
each theater was to pay at the same rate, the larger first-run theaters
would pay much more than they had under the old contract, while
the increases for smaller neighborhood theaters would not be as
large. 179 The magnitude of the proposed 200% increase in total
license fees can be more fully appreciated when compared to the 60%
rise in the consumer price index over the same period (1933-1946).180
In addition, such an arrangement would require purchasers to buy
the rights to more compositions than they want at a higher price than
they desire to pay. 181 Finally, such licenses could be used to approx-
175. Film Daily, Mar. 28, 1947, at 1, Col. 3; Motion Picture Daily, Mar. 24, 1947, at 1, col.
4.
176. Film Daily, Mar. 28, 1947, at 1, col. 3; Motion Picture Daily, Mar. 24, 1947, at 1, col.
4.
177. Variety, Apr. 23, 1947, at 38, col. 1. The annual fee was 10 cents per seat for theatres
with less than 800 seats, 15 cents per seat for theatres with 800 to 1599 seats, and 20 cents per
seat for theatres with more than 1,600 seats. 1d.
178. Film Daily, Aug. 22, 1947, at 1, col. 2; Hollywood Rep., Aug. 22, 1947, at 1, col. 4.
ASCAP desired to charge an annual fee equal to the dollar amount the licensee would collect at
top adult prices from a single performance at full capacity in his theatre. Film Daily, supra, at
1, col. 2; Hollywood Rep., supra, at 1, Col. 4.
179. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F.
Supp. 888, 895 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). For a discussion of
Alden-Rochelle, see notes 185-88 and accompanying text infra.
180. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 210-11
(1975); Motion Picture Daily, Aug. 25, 1947, at 1, col. 4. Moreover, exhibitors were at the same
time experiencing a 15-20% decline in attendance from the peak levels of 1946. Variety, Oct. 1,
1947, at 16, col. 4.
181. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80
F. Supp. 888, 892, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). At the time,
many film producers were affiliated with music publishers who were members of ASCAP and
shared in the blanket licensing fees paid by exhibitors. Id. at 892. If a film producer wanted to
use music owned by a member of ASCAP, the producer obtained a license to record the music
on the sound track but not to perform it in the theater; thus, the exhibitor had to pay ASCAP
for a blanket license to show the film and, thus, the film producer's publisher affiliate benefit-
ted. Id. at 892-93. If the producer sought to use music not owned by ASCAP, the producer
obtained a license both to record and to perform; the cost of the license to perform would then
be reflected in the fee charged the exhibitor, and the exhibitor would not have to pay for a
separate blanket license. Id. at 893. The exhibitors argued that all music should be licensed in
this second way, freeing them of any obligation to pay for blanket licenses. Id. at 895-96. In
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imate the effects of a discriminating monopoly.18 2
Motion picture exhibitors strenuously resisted the proposed in-
crease and, after much negotiation, a compromise was reached be-
tween ASCAP and a representative of the majority of theater
exhibitors.' s3 Some exhibitors, however, continued to fight any "seat
Alden-Rochelle, the exhibitors achieved their objective when the court issued a decree which,
in effect, mandated the second method of handling performance rights. Id. at 903. See notes
185-88 and accompanying text infra.
182. The following diagram will be of assistance in explaining how such a result might occur:
Price I
Ordinary Demand Cur
Marginal Revenue Curve Supply or Marginal Cost Curve
0 E C Quantity
Because a monopolist is free to choose the price at which he will sell his product, and
thereby determine the quantity he will produce, ordinarily he will opt to maximize his profits
by producing that quantity of goods at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue and charg-
ing the corresponding price which the demand curve indicates the market will bear at that
output. Figure 1 indicates that since the marginal cost of supplying performance rights to exist-
ing compositions is zero at all quantities, see notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra, the
monopolistic owner of such rights would choose to sell OE units of performance rights at price
OA. The monopolist thus takes in OAFE in total revenue.
If the monopolist can charge each buyer the amount that the buyer is willing to pay,
however, he can increase his total revenues. That is, those on the DF portion of the demand
curve would be willing to pay more than price OA for each unit of performance rights, and
those on the FC portion of the demand curve will purchase performance rights if a price less
than OA is charged. The shaded triangles DAF and FBC represent the additional revenues such
price discrimination would produce. A monopolist's price discrimination is perfect if the
monopolist can charge each buyer the maximum he or she is willing and able to pay. J. ROBIN-
SON, supra note 86, 187 n.l.
Although the difficulty of determining how much each buyer is willing to pay makes this
result impracticable, the same results can be approximated by a blanket license, under which a
buyer must purchase either a certain quantity of performance rights or none at all. Thus, if
buyers are given the choice of purchasing either OC units at an average price of OA or nothing
at all, then-assuming they buy-the total revenue derived is reflected in OABC. Since
triangle DAF is equal to triangle FCB, the total revenue from the all-or-nothing bargain
(OABC) is equal to the total revenue of the discriminating monopolist (DOC). See id. at 187; W.
VICKNEY, supro note 52, at 104. For a more complete analysis of the effect of the blanket
license, see Cirace, supra note 23, at 285-86.
183. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80 F.
Supp. 888, 895 (S.D.N.Y.), modifted, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Cirace, supra note 23,
at 291.
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tax."' 84  In Alden-Rochelle v. American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers,185 it was held that ASCAP had violated the
Sherman Act,'8 6 and that motion picture exhibitors could no longer be
required to buy performance licenses as a transaction separate from
the lease of the pictures to which they pertained.' 8 7 Film producers
thereafter negotiated directly with individual copyright owners or
their publishers for performance rights, and supplied theatres the
performance rights along with the films. 188
1. Composers Versus Video-Film Producers
The system prior to Alden-Rochelle gave composers monopoly
power over theatre exhibitors because ASCAP and another perform-
ing rights society, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), 18 9 were the only
major sellers of performance rights to over 16,000 theatres. 190 In
contrast, the present system skews bargaining power in the other di-
rection. The dozen or so major video-film producers have monopsony
power over most of the myriad composers with whom they deal.' 9 '
Thus, it is not surprising that the composers brought suit against
video-film producers.
In Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 192 the composers al-
leged that the video-film producers, acting in concert, refused to con-
184. Film Daily, Feb. 18, 1948, at 1, col. 1.
185. 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In Alden-
Rochelle, the operators of 200 motion picture theaters sought treble damages and injunctive
relief on the theory that ASCAP's licensine policies violated the federal antitrust laws. Id. at
890. The court denied money damages, but held that the theater operators were entitled to
injunctive relief. Id. at 895-99. In so holding, the court stated that "[a]lmost every part of the
[ASCAP] structure, almost all of [ASCAP's] activities in licensing motion picture theatres, in-
volve a violation of the anti-trust laws." Id. at 893. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See also M.
Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed mer. sub nor.
M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949) (holding that
ASCAP's licensing practices violated the antitrust laws).
186. 80 F. Supp. at 893.
187. 80 F. Supp. at 890. See note 181 supra.
188. See Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The ASCAP Con-
sent Judgment of 1950, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 294, 302 (1954).
189. BMI has been described recently as follows:
BMI, a nonprofit corporation owned by members of the broadcasting industry, was
organized in 1939, is affiliated with or represents some 10,000 publishing companies and
20,000 authors and composers, and operates in much the same manner as ASCAP. Almost
every domestic copyrighted composition is in the repertory either of ASCAP, with a total
of three million compositions, or of BMI, with one million.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979) (footnote omitted).
190. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80
F. Supp. at 892; cf. note 189 supra (indicating that ASCAP's and BMI's control of copyright
licenses has continued to the present).
191. See notes 192-204 and accompanying text infra.
192. 379 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd and remanded, 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tract for their services except on certain standard terms reserving to
producers the copyright and other ownership rights in words and
music composed on their behalf. 193 The terms were contained in
three successive contracts negotiated between the Composers and
Lyricists Guild of America (CLGA) and the Association of Motion Pic-
ture and Television Producers, a trade association of motion picture
producers. 194  These standard agreements represented the minimum
terms under which composers' services could be obtained. 195 Pur-
suant to these contracts, film producers owned the copyrights to the
works composed. 196 Although each of the successive contracts pro-
vided increased wages and shares of the copyright royalties, the pro-
ducers generally refused to agree to copyright ownership by indi-
vidual composers.197
The economic issues reflected in Bernstein can be reduced to
two: 1) who should own the copyright to music composed for video-
films; and 2) assuming composers retain the copyright to their music,
should the remuneration for performance rights be determined prior
to production or should it be periodically renegotiated? The charac-
teristics of musical compositions and video-films discussed earlier 198
prevent any simple solution to these problems. The public good
characteristic of musical compositions makes the identification of the
value of a composer's contribution to the product difficult to deter-
mine -i.e., since the marginal cost of using the composition is
zero,' 99 any price set for the composer's work will be arbitrary and
bear no relation to an efficient market price. 200 If, in addition,
monopoly or monopsony power is introduced respectively on the
composer or producer side of the market, the price established is
likely to be not only arbitrary, but either excessive or inadequate. 201
Since the first issue-the proper ownership of the copyright to
music composed for video-films- cannot be determined by any ob-
193. 517 F.2d at 978-79; 379 F. Supp. at 935.
194. 517 F.2d at 978-79; 379 F. Supp. at 934-35.
195. 517 F.2d at 978-79; 379 F. Supp. at 936-37. Pursuant to these terms, composers re-
ceived at least 50% of the performance fees for their works. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures,
Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (on remand, district court denied motion for a jury trial
because of the complexity of the issues). Furthermore, the producer became the owner of the
copyright. Id. at 61-62. On occasion, however, a composer in greater public favor could com-
mand enough bargaining power to enable him to retain the copyright and receive a greater
share of the performance fee. Id. at 62.
196. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 61-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also
note 195 supra.
197. 517 F.2d at 979; 379 F. Supp. at 937. See also note 195 supra.
198. See notes 36-105 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 52-54 & 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 25: p. 417
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jective criterion, the determination must be made politically. 20 2  On
the principle that such issues should be resolved against those with
market power, the ownership of the copyright should be awarded to
the composers. This solution would be especially appropriate if all
terms concerning recording and future performance rights were to be
finally negotiated prior to production; 20 3 the producer benefits by fix-
ing a cost for the film early in its production, and the composer ben-
efits since ownership of copyright means that he retains the exclu-
sive right to all revenue derived from the music when performed
outside the movie theatre.
Once the ownership of the copyright is allocated to the com-
poser, the licensing fee can be determined in one of four ways: 1) by
final negotiation with individual composers prior to production; 2) by
negotiation with individual composers subject to periodic renegotia-
tion; 3) by collective bargaining with composers prior to production;
or 4) by collective bargaining with composers subject to periodic re-
negotiation.
Prior to production of a video-film, the individual composers are
not only without monopoly power themselves, but are subject to the
monopsony power of the highly concentrated video-film producers. 204
Thus, requiring final negotiation with the individual composers prior
to production would unfairly limit the composers' return on their
work.
If, however, the composer has the right to renegotiate his share
of the proceeds from a video-film after production -when substitu-
tion is no longer feasible 20 5 - the composer is in a kind of monopoly
position with respect to that particular film. To prohibit the producers
from securing contracts establishing an enduring price for the
performance rights to music used in soundtracks is to enable the
composers to exact unfairly high licensing fees after production.
Moreover, if composers were permitted to bargain collectively when
renegotiating performance license fees, they would wield the same
kind of bargaining power held to be unlawful in Alden-Rochelle. 20 6
202. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 204-08 and accompanying text infra.
204. See note 191 and accompanying text supra. A composer's position is not aided by any
supposed "uniqueness" of his artistic product. See CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 771, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd and remanded sub non. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The
district court in BMI noted that video-film producers view compositions as "substantially inter-
changeable," 400 F. Supp. at 771, or even "fungible." Id. at 783.
205. Substitution of different music would be extremely costly once the music is affixed to a
soundtrack and many film prints have been produced.
206. See notes 166-88 and accompanying text supra.
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Therefore, to prevent the composers from exerting such power, a
composer's share in the profits should be determined prior to produc-
tion. Collective bargaining should be employed, however, to amelio-
rate the disparity in bargaining power between individual composers
and video-film producers. The minimum basic agreements involved in
Bernstein were negotiated on this basis and provide precedent for
such an arrangement.20 7 Contracts between producers and perform-
ing artists, requiring that the latter be paid residuals-i.e., requiring
payment each time a video-film is run-are similarly negotiated. 20
2. Musical Performing Rights Societies Versus the Television Net-
works
The Alden-Rochelle decree prohibited the performing rights
societies from engaging in collective bargaining with the owners of
motion picture theaters on behalf of the copyright owners. 20 9  As a
result of Alden-Rochelle, film producers negotiate with individual
composers for the performance rights to their compositions and sup-
ply those rights to the theater owners along with the film. 210  The
case, however, did not involve the different medium of television.
Producers making video-films for television continued to obtain
licenses which only covered the recording of music on soundtracks,
and the networks were thus required to purchase blanket perform-
ance licenses in order to broadcast the films. 211 CBS then chal-
lenged the blanket performance licence in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 212 on the grounds that it violated the Sherman Act's ban on
price fixing and tying contracts.2 13  Although the network would have
207. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d at 978-79; 379 F. Supp. at 936-37;
notes 194-97 and accompanying text supra. In 1971, the composers launched an unsuccessful
strike and simultaneously filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleg-
ing that the refusal of the Association of Motion Picture and Television Producers to bargain
with the CLGA over copyright ownership violated § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
517 F.2d at 979. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3)-(5), 158(a)(13) (1976); see notes 194-96 and accompany-
ing text supra. The CLGA subsequently withdrew its unfair labor practice charge recognizing
that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction over it since CLGA members are independent contractors
rather than employees. See 517 F.2d at 980.
208. OWEN, supra note 47, at 34-35, 37, 42.
209. 80 F. Supp. at 903.
210. See notes 161-88 and accompanying text supra. See also note 181 supra.
211. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737,
742-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), revd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), revd and remanded sub nom.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S.1 (1979). For a discussion of Broadcast Music, Inc., see
notes 212-25 and accompanying text infra.
212. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). For further discussion of Broadcast Music, Inc., see generally Cirace,
supra note 23.
213. 441 U.S. at 6. See Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). CBS sought injunctive
relief for the alleged antitrust violations and a declaration of copyright misuse. 441 U.S. at 6
n. 7.
[VOL. 25: p. 417
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been satisfied with an injunction merely enjoining ASCAP and BMI
from offering blanket licenses-thereby allowing the networks to seek
performance licenses from individual composers-CBS also sought to
substitute a "per use" system. 214 Under such a system, ASCAP and
BMI would be required to license compositions in the ASCAP and
BMI pools in accordance with a schedule of fees established under
court supervision. 215  Since television networks produce very few of
the video-films they broadcast, relying instead on the same producers
who supply theatres, 216 such a decree would probably lead to a sys-
tem like that instituted in the wake of Alden-Rochelle, -i.e., video-
film producers would supply performance rights to the networks
along with the video-films. 2
17
In Broadcast Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the col-
lective selling of musical performance rights to television networks is
not per se illegal, but must be judged by a "rule of reason"
analysis. 218 The Supreme Court's explicit reluctance to give a defini-
tive decision is understandable given the presence of the income
distribution problem analyzed above. 2 19 The problem is further
complicated by the kind of market structure involved: a bilateral
monopoly. 220  In such a market, since neither the buyer nor the seller
can dominate the other, price and output are indeterminate, de-
214. 400 F. Supp. at 747. See Cirace, supra note 23, at 297-98.
215. 400 F. Supp. at 747 n.7.
216. Id. at 742.
217. See notes 166-88 & 209-10 and accompanying text supra.
218. 441 U.S. at 16. The Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit which had held
that in issuing blanket licenses to television networks, the performing rights societies were
engaged in price fixing which is illegal per se under the Sherman Act. 562 F.2d at 140. See
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Having found a per se violation, the court of appeals
had not needed to consider the "rule of reason" analysis and, therefore, the Supreme Court
remanded. 441 U.S. at 16. On remand, applying the "rule of reason" approach, the Second
Circuit held that the issuance of blanket, nonexclusive licenses did not unreasonably restrain
trade in violation of the Sherman Act. CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and
Producers, 48 U.S.L.W. 2713 (2d Cir. May 6, 1980), implementing Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
219. See notes 36-105 and accompanying text supra. The Broadcast Music, Inc. Court stated
that "we have some doubt-enough to counsel against application of the per se rule-about the
extent to which this practice threatens . . . competitive pricing as a free market's means of
allocating resources." 441 U.S. at 23 (citation omitted).
220. See Cirace, supra note 23, at 281-85. Actually, the market structure involved in the
Broadcast Music, Inc. situation is a bilateral oligopoly-i.e., several sellers confronting several
buyers. Id. at 281. There are two major domestic sellers (ASCAP and BMI), and three major
buyers (CBS, NBC, and ABC). See 441 U.S. at 4-5. Nevertheless, the market structure of a
bilateral monopoly is substantially analogous to a bilateral oligopoly because both ASCAP and
BMI have substantial monopoly power and the television networks have substantial monopsony
power. Moreover, bilateral monopoly and bilateral oligopoly are analytically indistinguishable
because price and output in both market structures are indeterminate and depend upon the
bargaining rules and the strategy employed. See W. VICKREY, supra note 52, at 115-16.
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pending upon bargaining rules and strategy. 221 Thus, if composers
have the right to periodically renegotiate performance rights to exist-
ing video-films on a collective basis, they will have great monopoly
power. The previous discussion of the conflict over the separate sale
price of performing rights to music for films exhibited in theatres es-
tablished that until antitrust actions such as Alden-Rochelle loosened
their grip on that medium, the performing rights societies used their
collective power through blanket licensing to approximate the dis-
criminating monopoly solution. 222  Continuing to permit unregulated
blanket licensing of performance rights to television networks would
simply perpetuate the existing monopoly power of the composers
over the television medium.
On the other hand, the major television networks have great
monopsony power over video-film producers 223 who, in turn, have
monopsony power over individual composers. 224 Thus, if the net-
works can require video-film producers to supply performance rights
along with the video-films, and if the individual composers lack the
power to periodically renegotiate their agreements with the produc-
ers, the networks can not only avoid the monopoly power of the per-
forming rights societies, but can also assert monopsony power over
individual composers to obtain a lower price through their monop-
sony power over video-film producers. Moreover, given the bilateral
monopoly market structure plus the public good aspect of video-films,
there is no market solution to the dilemma of whether to grant com-
posers monopoly power via renegotiation rights or to permit televi-
sion networks to exercise their monopsony power in the manner just
discussed.225
The only viable solution, short of having the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal 226 set the price for performance rights on the basis of politi-
221. W. VICKREY, supra note 52, at 115-16; Cirace, supra note 23, at 283-84; note 220
supra.
222. See notes 164-88 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 114-44 and accompanying text supra.
224. See notes 189-208 and accompanying text supra.
225. See Cirace, supra note 23, at 281-85; notes 47-103 and accompanying text supra. In the
analogous situation of labor negotiations between an industrywide labor union and a corporate
giant, a middle ground is possible because marginal cost is not zero. For example, when the
United Auto Workers union bargains with General Motors over the wage rate, the marginal cost
to workers of foregoing leisure or unemployment benefits is weighed against the value of the
marginal hour of labor to the employer. A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY, 131-36
(2d ed. 1979); W. VICKREY, supra note 52, at 116.
226. The Copyright Act of 1976, established the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 801-810 (Supp. 1978), to consist of five commissioners appointed for seven year terms by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 802. The tribunal is empowered to
adjust copyright royalty rates with respect to compulsory licenses for the right to record
phonorecords sold to the public, id. § 115, and compulsory licenses for juke boxes, id. § 116. It
[VOL. 25: p. 417
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cal considerations and adjusted historical prices, 227 is to attempt to
develop a competitive market solution through government interven-
tion. To be successful, such an attempt must diminish the effect of
the monopoly elements in the video-film industry. First, competition
within the television medium can be fostered by allowing cable tele-
vision to compete with network broadcasters without restraints on the
content of either's programming. In return, cable television stations
would be subject to full copyright liability to video-film' producers for
all distant signal importation. 228  Second, video-film producers should
be required to supply networks with the performance rights to music
recorded on soundtracks along with the video-film. Finally, composers
should bargain collectively with video-film producers prior to produc-
tion for a minimum share in all future profits derived from video-films
on which their compositions are recorded. These recommendations
attempt to strike the same balance sought in the recommendations
proposed above for the conflict between the composers and the video-
film producers, and are based on the same reasoning. 229
On the other hand, with respect to the performing rights for
compositions recorded on existing video-films to be shown on broad-
cast or cable television, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal should be
given authority to set license fees based upon historical prices. Since
any price established for licensing fees is arbitrary and unrelated to
any objectively determined cost of the product, 230 basing such fees on
historical price would both avoid the unresolvable wrangling of re-
negotiation and preserve established market expectations. As the
video-films in this category become a smaller percentage of the total
number shown, the licensing fees should reflect that fact.
is also authorized to determine the proper distribution of royalties for public broadcasting if
performing rights societies and broadcasters fail to agree, id. § 118, and, within prescribed
limits, to adjust compulsory royalty rates for cable television. Id. § 111(c). The Copyright Act
could be amended to authorize the tribunal to set performance license fees for commercial
television as well. For other duties of the tribunal, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text
supra.
227. Historical price has already been used in one context: in the implementation of the 1950
consent decree which ASCAP signed with the United States Government empowering the fed-
eral district court to set a reasonable fee for performing rights should ASCAP and a licensee fail
to agree. United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, [1950-1951]
Trade Cas. 62,595, at 63,750, 63,754 (1950). The court has never exercised this power, but
has instead preferred to take the role of mediator. See Garner, supra note 23, at 127-28. How-
ever, the court has set interim fees in this manner, pursuant to authority also conferred by the
decree. [1950-1951] Trade Cas. at 63,754. See Garner, supra note 23, at 145. Given the wide
range of possible prices for a product whose marginal cost is zero, the court, if it did choose to
set a price, would probably choose the historical price with minor adjustments.
228. See notes 231-56 and accompanying text infra.
229. For the reasoning underlying these recommendations, see notes 198-208 and accompany-
ing text supra.
230. See notes 36-105 and accompanying text supra.
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C. The Conflict Over Copyright Liability for
Imported Broadcast Signals
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 231 and in
Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 232 the Supreme Court held that cable
systems incurred no copyright liability under the Copyright Act of
1909233 for the retransmission of local and distant broadcast signals to
cable system subscribers. 234 Nevertheless, four policy studies by in-
dependent commissions 235 and the 1971 Consensus Agreement be-
tween broadcasters, cable systems, and video-film producers agreed
that some form of copyright liability should exist for programs im-
ported by cable systems.2 36 The Copyright Act of 19762'7 adopted
this suggestion and imposes copyright liability under certain cir-
cumstances. 238 Pursuant to the statute, a cable system is subject to
compulsory licensing, whereby the cable system obtains the right to
retransmit the signals of any broadcast station licensed by the FCC in
return for an annual payment of royalties to the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal according to a fee schedule fixed by the statute. 239 The
Copyright Royalty Tribunal then divides the collected royalties among
the claiming copyright holders. 240
The compulsory license available to cable systems, however, is
limited to retransmissions of signals which FCC regulations permit
cable systems to carry in the first place. 241 Under current FCC reg-
231. 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (holding that cable systems have no copyright liability for retrans-
mitting signals carrying copyrighted motion pictures).
232. 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that cable systems have no copyright liability for retrans-
mitting distant signals carrying copyrighted programs).
233. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976).
234. 415 U.S. at 405, 414-15; 392 U.S. at 400-02. The Court reasoned that cable systems, in
retransmitting broadcast signals, do not "perform" the copyrighted material within the meaning
of § 1(c), (d) of the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1(c)-(d). 415 U.S. at 402-14; 392 U.S. at
395-402. For a discussion of the effect of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(Supp. 1978), see notes 237-41 and accompanying text infra.
235. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CABLE TELEVISION: PROMISE VERSUS REGULA-
TORY PERFORMANCE (Comm. Print 1976); CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CA-
BLE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1974); RESEARCH AND POLICY COMM. OF THE COMM. FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BROADCASTING AND CABLE TELEVISION: POLICIES FOR DIVERSITY
AND CHANGE (1975); SLOAN COMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE (1971).
236. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 284, app. D (1972). For further
discussion of the 1971 Consensus Agreement, see GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 27;
Lapierre, supra note 22; Venrill, CATV's Emerging Role: Cablecaster or Common Carrier, 34
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 586 (1969).
237. 17 U.S.C. 9 101-810 (Supp. 1978).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. 1978). See note 241 infra.239. Id. § 111(c), (d).
240. Id. § 111(d).
241. Id. § 111(c) (1), (2). Section 111(c) (2) provides that the "willfil and repeated" retrans-
mission of broadcast signals is an actionable infringement and subject to remedy under the
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ulations, cable systems are 1) required to carry certain broadcast sig-
nals; 242 2) limited in carrying distant commercial signals;243 and 3)
required to delete particular network or syndicated programs and cer-
tain sports events from signals which are carried. 244 The FCC's rec-
ognized jurisdiction over cable systems has been sharply confined by
the courts, however, which have struck down several FCC regula-
tions on the ground that the Commission either lacked, or failed to
establish, jurisdiction to promulgate such rules.2 45
Now, after more than a decade of what the FCC has described as
"tentative" regulation, 246 the Commission is conducting a rulemaking
proceeding intended to eliminate its distant signal and syndicated
exclusivity rules for cable systems. 247  Cable systems could thus re-
Copyright Act of 1976 "where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary transmission
is not permissible under the rules, regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Communications
Commission." Id. § 111(c) (2).
242. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57(a), .59(a), .61(a), .63(a) (1979) (requiring cable systems in
all markets to carry certain signals upon the request of the transmitting station; the extent of the
requirements varies with the size of the market and its location relative to the transmitting
broadcast stations).
243. See, e.g., id. §§ 76.59(b), .61(b), .63(b).
244. See, e.g., id. §§ 76.92-.99, .151-.161.
245. The Supreme Court has held that the FCC has jurisdiction over cable systems under
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976), but its authority is restricted to
that "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the [FCC's] various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting." United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157 (1968). For examples of FCC regulations of cable television held to lie beyond the bounds
of this authority, see, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 696 (1979) (invalidating
regulations requiring cable systems to carry at least 20 channels and to dedicate a minimum
number of channels to public, governmental, educational, and leased access); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (setting aside
regulations prohibiting cable systems from exhibiting certain feature films and sports events
carried by broadcast television on the ground that the FCC had not established jurisdiction). On
the other hand, courts have often upheld FCC regulation of cable systems. See, e.g., United
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (regulation requiring cable systems with
3,500 or more subscribers to provide facilities for the local production and transmission of origi-
nal programs upheld); Treasure Valley CATV Comm. v. United States, 562 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.
1977) (restrictions on the number of broadcast stations carried by a cable system upheld); Carter
Mt. Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 961 (1963)
(refusal to grant a cable system the facilities to import distant broadcast signals upheld where
FCC had found that such importation might destroy a local television broadcast station).
246. See Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable
Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 645 (1979) (report).
247. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004 (1979)
(notice of proposed rulemaking). The distant signal rules limit the number of broadcast signals a
cable system may carry according to the size of the market. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.63 (1979).
The FCC has listed four grounds for such regulation:
(1) as a means of assuring the public against a net loss of television service as a conse-
quence of cable-created audience losses which would undermine the economic support of
television stations and in the process deprive the poor and those living in areas unserved
by cable of video services; (2) as necessary to support the broadcast television station
allocations policy with its emphasis on local service; (3) as a means of eliminating what
was perceived to be the unfair means by which cable television systems competed with
local broadcasters, and (4) as necessary to assure against injury to the continued produc-
tion of television programming.
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transmit distant broadcast signals and syndicated programs without
limitation, other than the copyright liability arising under the
Copyright Act of 1976.248 The networks have opposed this pro-
posal. 249 In addition, some industry groups have urged the FCC to
require cable systems to obtain the consent of the broadcast station
whose signal is being retransmitted. 25 0  This suggestion has received
the support of the video-filn producers and major league professional
sports. 251
The battles over the proper extent of cable system regulation and
the price that cable systems ought to pay for the use of the broadcast
signals they retransmit are reflections of the broader conflict over in-
come distribution in the video-film industry. These issues are compli-
cated by the competitive threat posed by unrestricted cable systems
to the monopoly position of broadcast television networks. Technol-
ogy has also undermined the allocation of power preserved by existing
regulatory limitations on cable systems since satellite transmission of
microwave signals is becoming ever more economical and may make
satellite-connected cable television networks feasible and competi-
tive. 252
The conflict may be resolved by Congress, however, where
members of both houses have introduced legislation 253 substantially
71 F.C.C.2d at 1021 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the history and nature of these
rules, see Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable
Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 654-59 (1979) (report).
The syndicated exclusivity rules generally accord exclusive rights to carry certain programs
to major market television stations and forbid cable systems from retransmitting such programs
via imported distant signals. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-.161 (1979). The supporting rationale is
the same as that used to support regulation of distant signal importation. See 71 F.C.C.2d at
1021, quoted supra. For a discussion of the history of the syndicated exclusivity rules, see Cable
Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 951, 956-64 (1979) (report).
248. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1026,
1054 (1979); note 238 and accompanying text supra; note 241 supro.
249. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1027-28.
250. See id. The petition containing this recommendation was actually filed by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration of the United States Department of Com-
merce, id. at 1027, but broadcast interests were described as "generally receptive" to this
suggestion. Id. at 1030. Those supporting such a requirement agree that "the present mar-
ketplace is distorted because cable television is permitted to function outside the television
program distribution marketplace ...[so that] a retransmission consent policy might be a con-
structive, workable approach to bring cable into this marketplace." Id. Indeed, the Association
of Independent Television Stations perceived such a regulation as "'an acceptable form of
copyright"' Id. (source of quotation not cited).
251. Id. at 1031-32. Although the FCC denied the petition of the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration, id. at 1033-34, 1054, it did not altogether foreclose
further consideration of a retransmission consent requirement; indeed, it invited comments on
"all aspects of retransmission consent including details on how it would work." Id. at 1035.
252. See id. at 1015-16; note 94 supra.
253. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
S2,525 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1979); S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also H.R. 13015,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (forerunner of H.R. 3333).
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amending or entirely replacing the Communications Act of 1934.254
One of these acts, the proposed Communications Act of 1979,255
would eliminate FCC restrictions on distant signal importation by
removing the Commission's jurisdiction over cable systems, and
would also subject distant signal importation to full copyright li-
ability. 256  If such proposals are incorporated into final legislation
amending or replacing the Communications Act of 1934, the income
distribution problem in the video-film industry will be alleviated. Al-
lowing unrestricted competition between cable and broadcast televi-
sion may result in additional producers of video-films to supply them.
As the video-film industry becomes more competitive, the ability of
any interest group to take advantage of the industry's public good and
uncertainty of demand characteristics in order to shift the distribution
of income in the group's favor will diminish. Thus, passage of legisla-
tion such as the Communications Act of 1979 may not only lead to
greater competition and consumer choice, but may also reduce the
need for government intervention in the distribution of income.
IV. CONCLUSION
The five conflicts over income distribution in the video-film in-
dustry 257 are reflections of four economic characteristics of the indus-
try: 1) the uncertainty of demand for the products at the time the
decisions are made to invest in their production; 258 2) the public
good characteristic of the product; 259 3) the tendency within the in-
dustry toward natural monopoly or substantial concentration; 260 and
4) the common product characteristic of video-films. 261 As a result of
the public good characteristic of the products and the uncertainty of
254. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
255. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
256. Id. § 453. Section 453 provides in pertinent part:
(a) No person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall:
(2) rebroadcast or otherwise retransmit any program or portion of a program origi-
nated by a broadcast station without the express authority of such station or of the person
who owns or controls the exclusive rights to the program involved.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a), the Commission shall not have
any authority to establish or enforce any restriction, requirement, or other rule or regula-
tion relating to the retransmission by any person or any program or portion of a program
originated by a broadcast station. No State or unit of general local government shall have
any authority to establish or enforce any such restriction, requirement, or other rule or
regulation.
Id.
257. See notes 17-21 & 106-256 and accompanying text supra.
258. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text supra.
259. See notes 47-71 and accompanying text supra.
260. See notes 72-103 and accompanying text supra.
261. See notes 104-05 and accompanying text supra.
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demand for them, no objective market criteria exist by which to de-
termine the prices of the goods produced.2 62 The tendency toward
substantial concentration within the industry then permits those with
market power to use these characteristics to affect the prices of the
products so as to obtain a higher proportion of the revenues from
them. 263 Government intervention is required to redress inequities
in the balance of market power to permit a fairer distribution of in-
come among the various interests.2 64
After examining five areas of conflict within the video-film indus-
try, this article has suggested means of adjusting the allocation of
market power.
First, in light of the monopsony power of the major television
networks over video-film producers, there should be substantial re-
strictions on the permissible duration of exclusive exhibition contracts
demanded of producers by the networks. Since the four-year limit
contained in the consent decree between the Department of Justice
and NBC provides little change from the usual duration of negotiated
exclusivity contracts, the government's proposed two-year limitation
would more effectively remedy the weakness in the video-film pro-
ducers' bargaining position .265
Second, in light of the video-film producers' monopoly power
over exhibitors, video-film producers should be prohibited from re-
quiring motion picture exhibitors to bid blind.2 66
Third, composers should hold the copyright to the works they
produce for video-film producers and television networks, but they
should be required to bargain collectively prior to production for
their share of all future profits earned from the video-films using their
music. 267 The Copyright Royalty Tribunal should be given the au-
thority to set licensing fees for existing video-films based on historical
prices. 268
Fourth, in order to reduce the present monopsony power of
broadcast television networks over composers and video-film produc-
ers, regulations limiting cable systems in the importation of distant
broadcast signals should be removed to allow competition between
cable and broadcast television.2 69  At the same time, to ensure that
262. See notes 47-53 & 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
263. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text supra.
264. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text supra.
265. See notes 125-44 and accompanying text supra.
266. See notes 145-65 and accompanying text supra.
267. See notes 198-208 & 218-30 and accompanying text supra.
268. See notes 218-30 and accompanying text supra.
269. See notes 241-51 and accompanying text supra.
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cable systems compete for video-films on the same level, cable sys-
tems should be subject to full copyright liability. 270
Because of the economic characteristics of this industry, any as-
signment of the market position to any interest must be the arbitrary
result of political choice. To achieve a more equitable distribution of
income in the industry requires recognition that any such distribution
is ultimately determined by government intervention and cannot be
expected to arise naturally from market forces.
270. See notes 252-56 and accompanying text supra.
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